Shinobi’s Strawman is a weekly sequence the place our Technical Editor Shinobi challenges the Bitcoin group, aiming to fire up dialog round heated technical debates.
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We’re going to attempt one thing of an experiment immediately.
Drivechains are being proclaimed by some because the savior of Bitcoin, the reply to all of its issues. It solves the long term security budget, permits complete freedom to incorporate new features into Bitcoin, and presents no downsides for present Bitcoin customers.
Sounds too good to be true? It’s:
1) Drivechains Change Miner Incentives
Drivechains introduce a hodgepodge of latest variables into miners’ incentives, and after introducing that instability advocates push for users simply adopting a degraded security model for all new use cases and functionality by using a sidechain in lieu of changing the base layer. How is that this any totally different than an outright assault on Bitcoin self custody?
2) Current Sidechains Have No Adoption
There have been many alternative design proposals for sidechains through the years, however the one at present deployed ones are run by federations (Liquid and RSK), each of which have failed to realize any significant degree of adoption since they had been deployed. Does this imply sidechains are usually not value continued growth effort? Or are they value it, and the failure of federated chains to be adopted is solely the results of shortcomings in that particular sidechain design?
3) Drivechains Exacerbate The Dangers Of MEV
MEV is one thing that’s doable on Bitcoin already, as systems like Stacks are demonstrating, however at present the types of MEV doable on Bitcoin are both generated by completely impartial altcoins like Stacks (which traditionally have trended to an insignificant proportion of miners’ earnings, like Namecoin), or very low within the degree of complexity (like frontrunning Inscriptions). Drivechains open the door to arbitrarily complicated types of MEV on sidechains, whereas additionally making certain that the token producing that MEV is pegged to the worth of Bitcoin. I.e. it can’t merely fade away to an irrelevant fraction of miner earnings as folks cease shopping for an altcoin. This drastically worsens the dangers and potential harm of MEV on Bitcoin.
4) No, Swap Markets Aren’t An Reply
Paul Sztorc replied to a few of these concerns on Twitter, however these responses do not likely deal with the basis points. Swap markets would possibly sound like a solution, however the actuality is that these simply shove the liquidity necessities onto yet one more social gathering, assuming they may present huge quantities of liquidity for nearly nothing in return. Which may work for small scale utility customers, or having liquidity accessible to arbitrage uncertainty across the peg, I don’t suppose it is a foregone conclusion that sufficient liquidity to cowl the “answer to the safety price range downside” with out slippage is a given, to say nothing of all the opposite customers who would wish to swap out and in. He then goes on to disregard the distinction between a mainchain reorg, which requires redoing work and vitality expenditure, versus a sidechain reorg which doesn’t. Lastly, he equates a random individual for no logical or revenue pushed motive giving cash away with somebody producing a revenue with an exercise they’re the only real gatekeepers of.
Look, in the end, I’m a Bitcoin maximalist. I need what’s greatest for Bitcoin.
I feel drivechains are silly, harmful and a waste of time, however I wish to hear your ideas on the topic. Am I improper concerning the factors above? Is there another excuse that I needs to be towards drivechains that I’ve neglected?
Please don’t write to me with some random hopium. I’m open to novel opinions. I need the dialog to progress. Above is my greatest summation – we merely aren’t anyplace near a significant consensus on drivechains.
My DMs are open. Opinion@bitcoinmagazine.com. Let’s hash it out.
